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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In contrast to our present day where logicians, both formal and informal, are usually 
taken to be personages not known to draw attention to themselves either in the academic 
or societal setting, Petrus Ramus (aka Pierre de la Ramée) is quite notable. He began his 
academic career in Paris in 1536 only to find that his criticism of Aristotelian 
scholasticism lead to two of his works, Aristotelicae animadversions and Dialecticae 
Institutiones being prohibited. He himself was prohibited from teaching logic and 
rhetoric. His teaching situation improved when he left the University of Paris and was 
appointed Regius Professor at the College de France (1551). However, he converted from 
Catholicism and began a Huguenot in 1561, a move that only compounded his 
difficulties. He was ultimately decapitated in connection with the St. Bartholomew Day 
Massacres on August 26, 1572.1 
 Biographies of Ramus and historical entries in philosophy texts generally 
highlight his anti-Aristotelianism, his anti-scholasticism, his pedagogic and curricular 
revisionism, his humanistic orientation, and his Renaissance character and approach. 
Often these epithets are left without much explanation about the precise nature of Ramus’ 
ideas and efforts. The aim of this paper is to fill in some of the details for these rather 
abstract claims by examining sections of one of his most important works, the Dialectica. 
This work is central to understanding the pivotal role Ramus played in changing the 
understanding and role of logic and argumentation in his time.  
 Although the name of Ramus might not be mentioned much today among 
logicians of either the formal or informal sort, intellectual interest in him is on the rise,2 
and his historical importance for philosophy and modern thought in general is hard to 
overestimate. Works attributed to him and to Omer Talon, a collaborator, existed in close 
to eight hundred editions between 1543 and 1650. His Dialectica, which serves as the 
 
1 Further basic facts about Ramus can be found in entries:  Ramus, Petrus (1515-72) in the Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 8, pp. 51-55; La Ramée Pierre de, dit Ramus 1515-1572 in Encyclopedie 
Philosophique Universelle: Les Oeuvres Philosophiques, Dictionnaire, vol. 1, pp. 662-664; and in the entry 
cited in ft. 3 below. Indispensable for an overall view of Ramus is the work of W. Ong, Ramus, Method, 
and the Decay of Dialogue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958). 
2 Peter Sharratt has published a survey of contemporary literature on Ramus: "Recent Work on Peter Ramus 
(1970-1986)" in Rhetorica 5 (1987), pp. 7-58 and "Ramus 2000" in Rhetorica 18 (2000), pp. 399-455. 
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focus of this paper, appeared in approximately 250 editions;3 even the great English poet 
and writer, John Milton, produced a Latin edition of Ramus.4 Another remarkable feature 
of this work is that Ramus first published a French version of the work in 1555 before the 
Latin version which then became the subject of so many subsequent editions. This 
version, La Dialectique,5 whose contents diverge some from those of the Latin version, 
was consistent with Ramus’ divergence from the established academic world, its narrow 
traditional interests, and its isolation from the emerging culture of the times. A close 
study of the structural layout of the work and an examination of some of its contents will 
help to situate Ramus against the background of earlier medieval and ancient logic, 
showing the resemblances and dissimilarities between his approach and those of earlier 
thinkers.  
 Ramus becomes a focus of several ways in which culture and cultural shifts affect 
argument. The shift from Medieval to Renaissance periods, the shift from an Aristotelian 
to a post-Scholastic approach to logic, the shift from logic as deductive to dialectical, the 
shift from logic’s employment about abstract ontological/theological issues to its 
application to applied multi-disciplinary topics, the shift from the style of medieval 
writers and their Latin to that of ancient writers of both classical prose and poetry, the 
shift from a single unalterable text to one subject to hefty revisions, and even the shift 
from Latin as the only language of scholarly philosophizing—all these and others make 
Ramus a paradigm figure in the discussion of “Argument Cultures.” 
 
2. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
In viewing Ramus’ achievements one must situate him against the historical background 
of his writings. The change in logic with which he has always been associated—such that 
people could be referred to as Ramists or anti-Ramists—has always been linked to a kind 
of opposition with the Aristotelian logic that had dominated through the Middle Ages. Of 
course, the type of logic taught did not persist through the whole period without change. 
Initially the logic was based on the translation of the few works of the Organon 
(Categories, On Interpretation) rendered into Latin by Boethius (480-525 A.D.) along 
with the Porphyrian Isagoge (introduction) that became very important for the medieval 
problem of universals. These were the works of Boethius on logic that came to constitute 
the so-called Logica vetus (Old Logic) which extended up to the time of Abelard (1079-
1142). When the remaining texts ofthe Aristotelian corpus became widely accessible and 
the Analytics came to be utilized in Western thinking, the so-called Logica nova (New 
Logic) was born. Although one cannot make a clean cut between the parts of Aristotle’s 
logic, much less dichotomize them, one can at least claim with some certitude that Ramus 
was not interested in the formal side of Aristotle’s logical enterprise. That is to say, he 
did not write a commentary on the Prior or Posterior Analytics of Aristotle. However, 
one can say that his interest in rhetoric inclined him to focus on those aspects of Aristotle 
that would be linked to the less formal side of Aristotle’s logical enterprise. The very title 
of his famous work La Dialectique (Dialecticae duo libri/Dialectica) as well as the 
                                                 
3 Ramus, Peter. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed., vol. 8, p. 236. 
4 Joannis Miltoni Angli, Artis Logicae Plenior Institutio ad Petri Rami Methodum concinnata, Londoni, 
1672  
5 Dialectique (1555), ed. M. Dassonville (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1964). 
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Dialecticae Institutiones point to this. Now, this must be said with some qualification. 
Anyone perusing either of these will find forms of reasoning that appear very much like 
syllogisms—a sight familiar to those reading the Analytics. Closer inspection, however, 
reveals that Ramus does not employ letters as variables or place-holders as Aristotle did 
in his Analytics. Furthermore, one finds the very things admitted as syllogisms would 
only be recognized as such by Aristotle if the Peripatetic were using the term ‘syllogism’ 
homonymously.  
 However, before pursuing that matter, it might be helpful to locate how exactly 
Ramus stood vis-à-vis Aristotle. One of his basic criticisms about the Old Logic is that it 
simply did not provide an inventive or practical way for the mind. An interesting passage 
regarding this occurs within Ramus’ Aristotelicae Animadversiones. After making some 
critical remarks about Aristotle he writes:   
 
But we have been delaying too long in the entrance way, let us go in, let us look at the categories:  
do they contain any power of invention (discovery) and some doctrine that is both true and useful?  
I here see no art, no utility of any art whatsoever, but a most uncomfortable confusion of all arts; 
what, you say, can there be any wiser and more useful counsel to men than to partition all of 
nature by means of genera, species, and differences gradually and orderly into the ten highest 
ranks—just what Aristotle did in the categories?6  (p. 14, l. 38)   
 
 Of course, the question is bitter with sarcasm. Later, he offers another image, a 
militaristic and strategic one, bearing on the Categories of Aristotle. He writes,  
 
don’t you see the very camps fortified and enclosed by bulwarks from one side and another (they 
call these the ante-predicaments and the post-predicaments)?  I see, I said, but camps hostile to 
dialectical truth and bulwarks inimical to it […]7 
 
The ante-predicaments and the post-predicaments that Ramus is referring to are basically 
those elements treated by Aristotle in the three chapters of the Categories preceding and 
the five chapters following respectively his elaboration of the individual ten categories 
(chapters 4-9), i.e., substance, quality, quantity, relation, etc. This division is a long-
standing one in the Aristotelian tradition (although not in Aristotle himself) and can be 
found in scholastic textbooks into the 20th century.8 Among the ante-predicaments one 
finds the division of univocal, equivocal, and denominative terms, the distinction of 
complexes and simples, the presence-in-a-subject and predictability-of-a-subject, etc. 
Among the post-predicaments are the properties that are said of the categories proper 
themselves, e.g., opposition, priority, simultaneity, etc. However, all of this, as is clear 
from the quotations above are not yielding the type of logical tool to increase knowledge. 
One could infer, of course, from the very title of his work (Dialectica) that Ramus’ 
                                                 
6 P. 14, line 38 ff.: “At in vestibulo nimium diu moramur, introeamus, categories intueamur: an inveniendi 
vim, doctrinamque aliquam et veram, et utilem continent?  Nullam artem hic video: nullam artis cuiusquam 
utilitatem, sed confusionem atrium omnium incommodissimam, quid (inquies) potestne sapientius esse 
consilium et hominibus utilius, quam omnem rerum naturam per genera, species, differntias gradatim, atque 
ordinatim descriptas in decem egregias acies (quod in categoriis fecit Aristoteles) partiri?” 
7 P. 14, line 15—p. 15. Line 3:  “Non vides veluti propugnaculis hinc et inde (antepraedicamenta, et 
postpraedicament nominant)castra ipsa septa, vallataque?  Video, inquam, sed castra hostilia et inimica 
propugnacula dialecticae veritati […]. 
8 See, for instance, J. Gredt's, Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae (Freiburg: Herder, 1961), 
pp. 147-153 and pp. 185-188.  
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approach was arising more from the Topics of Aristotle where the development of topoi 
(loci or places of argument) is given.  
But, as one commentator has noted, it is not always clear to what extent the 
ravings against Aristotle are decidedly against the Peripatetic or to what extent they are 
determined by the polemical environment in which Ramus finds himself and by the 
opponents with whom he is confronted. The program of pedagogical reform in which 
Ramus was engaged and which seems to have directed the arc of his whole career was a 
major factor in his writing. He came to be associated with the Royal College that itself 
had been established to break with the very long and burdensome program of the 
University. A logic that would be useful in the training, not of clerics but of 
administrators to work outside of the confines of Church and university seemed to be just 
what the King wanted and the government needed.  
Nonetheless, Ramus was well-recognized as a critique of Aristotle. This was so 
widely recognized that later Francis Bacon would warn that though he too was also anti-
Aristotelian, confusion with Ramus was to be avoided since he himself was not, 
 
in league with that recent rebel […] Peter Ramus. I have nothing in common with that hide-out of 
ignorance, that pestilent bookworm, that begetter of handy manuals. Any facts that he gets hold of 
and begins to squeeze in the rack of his summary method soon lose their truth, which oozes or 
skips away, leaving him to garner only dry and barren trifles. Aquinas, Scotus, and their followers 
out of their unrealities created a varied world; Ramus out of the real world made a desert. Though 
that was the character of the man he has the effrontery to prate of human utilities. I rate him below 
the sophists.9 
 
There are passages in Ramus where the criticism of Aristotle himself runs very deep. 
Consider, for instance, his Dialecticarum Scholarum, Bk. IV, c. 1 he criticizes Aristotle 
for not following his own rules by failing to define what a category is, either generally or 
specifically.10 In c. 6 he notes that substance is not defined,11 and that it is no excuse to 
claim that it cannot be defined because it is one of the highest kinds since other such 
terms as genus, species, and difference are defined. But it is in c.13 (De usu 
Categoriarum) that we find what is probably the core of the criticism that Ramus is 
making of Aristotle:  he does not treat of the more particularly relevant items and he does 
not provide examples.12  Below we will see how this gets supplied in detailed by Ramus.  
However, one can find in other examples raised by Ramus a greater positive 
rapprochement with the teaching of Aristotle. For instance, in the Dialecticae 
                                                 
9 Quoted in C. Walton, “Ramus and Bacon on Method,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 9 (1971), p. 
289. Walton cites the quote from B. Farrington's translation of the Temporis partus masculus.  
10 In hoc enim libro nec categoria in universum, nec in partibus sigillatim quid sit, explicatur aut definitur, 
p. 111 P. Rami Scholarum Dialecticarum seu Animadversionum in Organum Aristotelis, libri xx 
(Frankfurt, 1594; rpt. Frankfurt a. Main: Minerva, 1965). 
11 Quid est substantia? Categoria non definitur: hoc autem jam monui: […] substantiam non definiri. At 
dicet aliquis, Summum genus est, nec potest definiri. At (inquam) definiuntur genus, species, differentia, 
proprium, accidens, individuum […]. (Ibid., pp. 119-20). 
12 Quae deinde subalterna et specialissima? Caussae, fact,subjecta, adjuncta, dissentanea, comparata, 
nomina, tributiones, definitiones, testimonia, et eorum singulorum genera et species: quae in Dialectica 
nostra persecuti sumus. Quid de his categoricus author?  horum omnium nihil, excepta (quae oppositorum 
particula est) relatione: item effectis et adjunctis: quae actione fortassis et passione comprehendantur:  
Horum (inquam) omnium nihil non dico definitione, sed ne ulla qualicunque significatione notavit aut 
indicavit. Ibid., p. 143 
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Institutiones one finds page after page of syllogisms of the sort that would be found in 
other writers.13  Consider, for instance,  
 
Whatever participates in reason is a dialectician 
Every man participates in reason 
Every man is a dialectician14 
 
Yet, a few pages later he provides examples that would seem to deviate considerably 
from Aristotle’s logic: 
 
Junius gave birth to liberty for his country by his blood and that of his family 
Brutus was Junius 
Therefore, Brutus gave birth to liberty for his country by his blood and that of his 
family15 
 
Or again, 
 
Agesilaus was not painted by Apelles 
Alexander was painted by Apelles 
Therefore Alexander is not Agesilaus16 
 
What is striking about these syllogisms, in addition to the classical references which will 
be remarked upon below, is that they both involve the use of identity and they both are 
dealing with individuals in the term positions rather than universals. As most will 
recognize, Aristotle did not use individuals (apart from one instance in the Prior 
Analytics I, c.33—Miccalus and Aristomenos) for exemplifying either his valid or his 
invalid moods of the syllogism. Later logic books would have to struggle to make 
individual terms fit into the Aristotelian system. In such syllogisms as  
 
All men are mortal 
Socrates is a man 
Socrates is mortal 
 
The consensus developed that Socrates was to be taken as a class unto himself and thus 
the propositions in which he occurs should be taken to be "A" (universal affirmative) 
propositions.  
                                                 
13 Consider Peter of Spain, Summule Logicales, Tractatus 4.  
14 Quidvis particeps rationis est dialecticus 
Omnis homo est particeps rationis 
Omnis igitur homo est dialecticus  (p. 21, l. 19) 
15 Iunius suo et suorum sanguine patriae libertatem peperit 
Brutus erat Iunius 
Brutus igitur suo et suorum sanguine patriae libertatem peperit 
16 Agesilaus non est pictus ab Apelle 
Alexander est pictus ab Apelle 
Non est igitur Alexander Agesilaus. 
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However, another feature of interest in the case of these examples is that one 
begins to see the content has undergone a shift. The difference of the last two syllogisms 
from the prior two involves a paradigm shift from the preoccupation with standard 
medieval abstract philosophical issues. The later two examples display historical 
references to actual figures in antiquity—more than the just the usual "Sortes" (= 
Socrates) that one finds in such writers as Ockham and others. Further, they are not just 
articulating hackneyed philosophical truths as does the one given immediately above—a 
type found in such an author as Peter of Spain.  
Nonetheless, one can see that there is reason to take seriously the position that 
Ramus was not rejecting the older tradition entirely. One can see this, first of all, from 
some remarks made by Ramus that indicate his objections were directed more toward the 
scholastics and their traditionalist methods that showed no creativity or ability to break 
the inherited moulds of reading Aristotle. Second, the extremely systematic approach 
found in his Dialectica duo libri seems structurally to emulate the methodological 
architectonic of the scholastics.  
 
3. RAMUS’ APPROACH EXEMPLIFIED 
 
One aspect of this “architectonic” is seen in the schematic layouts that one finds 
underpinning his work and the sequential exposition of topics and subdivisions in his 
Dialectica. Perhaps the easiest way to illustrate this in a twofold fashion: first, by looking 
at some diagrammatic schemes that interrelate the various chapters of his treatise and 
second, by examining his consideration of what we might today call “indicator terms” in 
the inferences.  
 The diagrams in the appendices contain three reproductions of the division trees 
that govern his layout. These are found in the introductory material provided in the 1672 
Cambridge Latin edition by Guilliemus Amesius under the heading Resolution of P. 
Ramus’ Dialectica into Tables. The second diagram illustrates the division of chapters 
close to the one dealing with the topic of Similars (c.21/20) examined below and provides 
a final divisions in one of the furthest branch of the tree diagram. A table number is 
included in the box of “Comparatives” which is superordinate to the treatment of the 
similars. There are three aspects here that need to be noted. First of all, the trees of 
division go back to antiquity, beyond the tree or Porphyry who was an authoritative 
person for the medievals to Plato who employed these divisions in his later dialogues, the 
so-called Method of Collection and Division. Second, there is a dichotomizing tendency 
that appears here. This need not be a restriction in the organizing activity itself or even a 
limitation imposed by Ramus himself. However, there does seem to be, among some of 
his followers, the belief that such dichotomizing constituted a basic part of his approach. 
Third, one can see here that there are strong pedagogic benefits in organizing things in 
this way. Of course, the use of trees in contemporary logic, whether it be the more formal 
usage of the truth-functional sort for symbolic logic or the informal usage in analyzing 
argument structures, continues to be profitable. Regarding at least this point, then, one 
can say that Ramus contributed a practical dimension to a logic that had become abstract 
and aloof. Still, one can always overdo a good thing. The diagram in Appendix 3, dealing 
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with the life of Cicero, shows how Ramus thought this method could even be employed 
on the life of a particular historical figure.  
 Ramus’ logic became so widely influential largely because it seemed easily 
applicable to various areas of investigation. Indeed, even the varied and many editions of 
his Dialectica testify to this; many of them appeared with commentaries that invoked 
examples arising from a number of different disciplines. A fascinating example can be 
found in the early 1574 London edition of Rolandus Scotus whose Latin title17 reads (in 
English):  The two books of Dialectic of the P. Ramus, Royal Professor, illustrated by 
examples of all the arts and sciences, non only the divine ones, but also the mystical, 
mathematical, physical, medical, legal, poetical, and rhetorical. A dialectic (or logic) 
with this sort of reputation obviously will have great appeal across the wide spectrum of 
educated people, and shatters the “schoolman” image that apparently had shackled logic 
and its applications in earlier times. As noted earlier, it has been claimed that the position 
of “royal professor,” which Ramus occupied, was created—along with the royal 
college—to break free of the limitations which the medieval tradition had imposed on the 
educational system. One is tempted today to draw an analogy with the numerous applied 
areas of logic and the institutional changes of that time to attempts, arising today, at the 
“mobilization of knowledge” and the “entrepreneurial orientation” in higher education.  
Perhaps a useful illustration of this application can be found in the Scotus edition 
in chapter two (three in the Amesius edition) where Ramus is dealing with “On efficient, 
procreating and conserving cause.” Ramus himself uses only three citations from 
antiquity to illustrate his points, one from Ovid (de Remedio Amoris,1.135), one from 
Virgil, (Georgics 2.490) and one from Virgil, (Aeneid 4.365). Scotus however, expands 
this to four pages of text, filled first with a quotation from Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, 
then with a (dubious?) text of Pythagoras, then with a mathematical generation of a line 
from a point (more reliably Pythagorean), then with some remarks on efficient causes that 
preserve health (taken from Galen), then with a reference to Aristotle’s Meteorologica (?, 
bk I, c.9) concerning the role of the sun as an efficient cause, then with mention of 
contract as the cause of legal obligation, then with a reference to Isocrates bearing on the 
causal role of the kingly office, then with the causality exerted by the laws, citing 
Demosthenes, then the causal role that memory plays, citing Cicero; then a citation about 
divine causality from Porphyry’s (lost) On the History of Philosophy. The examples 
continue. One does see in this huge variety of authors, examples, and disciplines cited 
that the spirit of Ramus has opened up logic in a way that was not found in earlier texts.  
A close examination of at least part of a single chapter in Ramus will make more 
accessible a number of features mentioned thus far. First, it will show how there has 
really been a shift in argument culture in terms of the move from the medieval scholastic 
and theological modes of thinking to the Renaissance outlook. While the text remains in 
Latin,18 it is easy to see from a single chapter the contrast of a literary style resonant of 
the old schoolman Latin to both the elegant prose of a chief Latin stylist like Cicero and 
the crafted verse of such  poets as Ovid and Vergil. Also to be noted as quite remarkable, 
is the absence of citations from the Church Fathers such as Augustine or Jerome—a 
practice that had been widespread in the Middle Ages. Second, one can see that Ramus 
                                                 
17 P. Rami Regii Professoris Dialecticae Libri Duo. Exemplis omnium atrium et scientiarum illustrati, non 
solum Divinis, sed etiam mysticis, Mathematicis, Phisicis, Medicis, Iuridicis, Poeticis et Oratoriis. 
18 Again, the earlier version of this work was the French edition La Dialectique. 
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retains a certain scholastic rigor in his presentation of material, but he simplifies the 
material by presenting it through definitions and divisions, frequently governed by a 
dichotomizing tendency that became almost sacrosanct among some of his followers. 
Third, his presentation seems to be void of any metaphysical or theological issues or 
examples that preoccupied the philosophizing of the earlier period. His logic is meant to 
reach a broad audience and enable them to have a practical tool for all sorts of topics. To 
illustrate these points, consider the following chapter from what became his most 
influential work, the Dialectic. The consideration focuses on Book I, Chapter XXI, On 
Similars. The complete text of the chapter is provided in Appendix 4.  
I have inserted into the text certain things left out by Ramus. Often his references 
to works are not terribly precise. He refers to a specific book of a work but not a line; he 
sometimes leaves out the author whose work he is using. Often these are easy to 
supplement, especially in the case of authors. He seems especially fond of Cicero, Vergil, 
and Ovid. The French edition does not contain all of the examples below, it actually has 
some alternatives as well as translations of the ancients (mostly by Ronsard).19 Locating 
the lines has proved more challenging, but where possible they have been added. Many of 
the texts are less familiar to most academics today than they would have been in Ramus’ 
age, the contexts of the citations are unknown, and thus the illustrations might, at first, 
seem less helpful to us. However, close attention to the words and phrases themselves 
does make the point of the examples understandable. I have added numbers after each 
term to aid in making the corresponding connection to the text below.  
 
Up to this point the comparison was in quantity. Now follows comparison in quality by which the 
things compared are said to be such (quales), namely, similar or dissimilar. Those are similar 
whose quality is the same. A similitude is said to be a proportion and similar things are 
proportional. The indicator terms (notae) of a similitude which are included under a single term 
are: similar (similes – 1), image (effigies – 2), after the fashion of (more – 3), likeness (instar – 4), 
as (tamquam – 5), just as (sicuti – 6). Then there is the negation of dissimilitude: scarcely 
otherwise (haud secus – 7), not otherwise (non aliter – 8). 
 
Aeneid (Virgil)1.588: “Similar (1) to a god with respect to mouth and shoulders.” 
Phillipic (Cicero): “Although Servius Sulpicius was able to leave no clearer monument than the 
image (2) of his morals, virtue, constancy, piety, genius—a son.”   
Trist 1 (Ovid): “For either no one, or only he who brought those wounds to me, is able to remove 
them in the fashion of (3) Achilles.” 
In Piso (Cicero): “That one day was indeed to me the likeness of (4) immortality, the day I 
returned to the fatherland.” 
In Verrine (Cicero): “But suddenly at that moment, as (5) by means of a cup of Circes, he became 
a boar from a man.” 
For Pompey (Cicero): “And so all indeed now in these places see Cn. Pompey as (6) someone not 
sent from the city but fallen from heaven.” 
Aeneid 3.236: “Scarcely other than (7) as ordered, they did.” 
Phormio (Terence): “I am, and was, in no way otherwise (8) than he.” 
 
Although the passage continues, this much probably suffices to provide some 
insight into how Ramus’ work proceeds. This chapter occurs somewhat after the midpoint 
of the first book. The chapters preceding and following are much the same. Ramus 
produces definitions, sets up divisions and classifications, and provides exemplifications. 
                                                 
19 Pp. 85-86 
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What is striking in his work is the considerable precision in the formulation of 
definitions, the balancing of the divisions, and the sequencing of the examples. It is clear 
from the above that, not only does Ramus illustrate each of the indicator terms (notae), 
but also does so in the exact sequence in which they are first listed. This shows a rigor 
beyond that of many current textbooks for critical thinking. Ramus sees the definitions, 
divisions, and terms as tools to be effective in any area of inquiry or any discipline. There 
is really little doubt that it was this spirit that enable his admirers to carry through with 
his plan in their many and varied editions of his work in different areas of study and 
application.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
Ramus had an enormous impact on the development of philosophy and pedagogy in the 
Modern period. The impact was due not simply to his powerful personality but also to the 
events of his life as well, of course, as his own writings. His efforts to force a transition 
from the confined, inherited culture of the traditional university, from a rigid 
“Aristotelianism” to a more flexible philosophy of times, from abstract to more applied 
logical and methodological approaches mark him as someone who saw the study of 
reasoning as open to a new diversity. The popularity of his approach may also have been 
enhanced by his own daring use of the vernacular in his first edition of Dialectica, 
alongside his Renaissance expertise in classical Latin. Many English versions and 
commentaries appeared in subsequent decades and centuries. Even his own conversion 
from Catholicism to Protestantism may have contributed to the popularity he enjoyed in 
Protestant lands and among Protestant thinkers. He can be seen as a philosopher par 
excellence of the topic of this conference—a philosopher of argument spanning cultures 
and of the many cultures of argument.  
 
Link to appendix 1       Link to commentary 
Link to appendix 2 
Link to appendix 3 
Link to appendix 4 
 
